## Slides mainly from Poole \& Mackworth, chap 15

Datalog based on the following assumptions

- An agent's knowledge can be usefully described in terms of individuals and relations among individuals.
- An agent's knowledge base consists of definite and positive statements.
- The environment is static.
- There are only a finite number of individuals of interest in the domain.
An individual can be named.


## Datalog syntax

- A variable starts with upper-case letter.
- A constant starts with lower-case letter or is a sequence of digits (numeral).
- A predicate symbol starts with lower-case letter.
- A term is either a variable or a constant.
- An atomic symbol (atom) is of the form $p$ or $p\left(t_{1}, \ldots, t_{n}\right)$ where $p$ is a predicate symbol and $t_{i}$ are terms.


## Datalog syntax (ctd)

- A definite clause is either an atomic symbol (a fact) or of the form:

where $a$ and $b_{i}$ are atomic symbols.
- query is of the form ? $b_{1} \wedge \cdots \wedge b_{m}$.
- knowledge base is a set of definite clauses.


## Semantics: General Idea

A semantics specifies the meaning of sentences in the language. An interpretation specifies:

- what objects (individuals) are in the world
- the correspondence between symbols in the computer and objects \& relations in world
- constants denote individuals
- predicate symbols denote relations


## Formal Semantics

An interpretation is a triple $I=\langle D, \phi, \pi\rangle$, where

- $D$, the domain, is a nonempty set. Elements of $D$ are individuals.
- $\phi$ is a mapping that assigns to each constant an element of $D$. Constant $c$ denotes individual $\phi(c)$.
- $\pi$ is a mapping that assigns to each $n$-ary predicate symbol a relation: a function from $D^{n}$ into $\{T R U E, F A L S E\}$.


## Example Interpretation

Constants: phone, pencil, telephone.
Predicate Symbol: noisy (unary), left_of (binary).

- $D=\{s<, \mathbf{0}, 0\}$.
- $\phi($ phone $)=\mathbf{\mathbf { 0 }}, \phi($ pencil $)=\phi($ telephone $)=\mathbf{0}$.
- $\pi$ (noisy): | $\langle\delta<\rangle$ | FALSE | $\langle\mathbf{\sigma}\rangle$ | TRUE |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |$\langle\rangle\rangle$ FALSE $\pi$ (left_of):

| $\langle s<, s<\rangle$ | FALSE | $\left\langle{ }^{\circ}<\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{3}\right\rangle$ | true | $\left\langle\delta<2\right.$, ${ }^{\text {c }}$, | true |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | FALSE | $\langle\mathbf{\square}, \mathbf{\square}\rangle$ | FALSE | < $\mathbf{0}, 0\rangle$ | true |
| $\langle\otimes, 8<\rangle$ | FALSE | $\left\langle\right.$, $\left.{ }^{\text {a }}\right\rangle$ | FALSE | < $\otimes$, ${ }^{\text {¢ }}$ | FALSE |

## Important points to note

- The domain $D$ can contain real objects. (e.g., a person, a room, a course). $D$ can't necessarily be stored in a computer.
- $\pi(p)$ specifies whether the relation denoted by the $n$-ary predicate symbol $p$ is true or false for each $n$-tuple of individuals.
- If predicate symbol $p$ has no arguments, then $\pi(p)$ is either tRUE or FALSE.


## Truth in an interpretation

A constant $c$ denotes in $/$ the individual $\phi(c)$.
Ground (variable-free) atom $p\left(t_{1}, \ldots, t_{n}\right)$ is

- true in interpretation I if $\pi(p)\left(\left\langle\phi\left(t_{1}\right), \ldots, \phi\left(t_{n}\right)\right\rangle\right)=$ true in interpretation I and
- false otherwise.

Ground clause $h \leftarrow b_{1} \wedge \ldots \wedge b_{m}$ is false in interpretation / if $h$ is false in $I$ and each $b_{i}$ is true in $I$, and is true in interpretation $I$ otherwise.

## Example Truths

In the interpretation given before, which of following are true?

```
noisy(phone)
noisy(telephone)
noisy(pencil)
left_of(phone, pencil)
left_of(phone, telephone)
noisy(phone) \leftarrowleft_of(phone, telephone)
noisy (pencil) }\leftarrow\mathrm{ left_of(phone, telephone)
noisy(pencil)}\leftarrow left_of(phone, pencil
noisy(phone) \leftarrow noisy(telephone) ^ noisy(pencil)
```


## Example Truths

In the interpretation given before, which of following are true?

| noisy $($ phone $)$ | true |
| :--- | :--- |
| noisy $($ telephone $)$ | true |
| noisy $($ pencil $)$ | false |
| left_of $($ phone, pencil $)$ | true |
| left_of $($ phone, telephone $)$ | false |
| noisy $($ phone $) \leftarrow$ left_of $($ phone, telephone $)$ | true |
| noisy $($ pencil $) \leftarrow$ left_of $($ phone, telephone $)$ | true |
| noisy $($ pencil $) \leftarrow$ left_of $($ phone, pencil $)$ | false |
| noisy $($ phone $) \leftarrow$ noisy $($ telephone $) \wedge$ noisy $($ pencil $)$ | true |

## Models and logical consequences

- A knowledge base, $K B$, is true in interpretation I if and only if every clause in $K B$ is true in $I$.
- A model of a set of clauses is an interpretation in which all the clauses are true.
- If $K B$ is a set of clauses and $g$ is a conjunction of atoms, $g$ is a logical consequence of $K B$, written $K B \models g$, if $g$ is true in every model of $K B$.
- That is, $K B \models g$ if there is no interpretation in which $K B$ is true and $g$ is false.


## User's view of Semantics

1. Choose a task domain: intended interpretation.
2. Associate constants with individuals you want to name.
3. For each relation you want to represent, associate a predicate symbol in the language.
4. Tell the system clauses that are true in the intended interpretation: axiomatizing the domain.
5. Ask questions about the intended interpretation.

6 . If $K B \models g$, then $g$ must be true in the intended interpretation.

## Computer's view of semantics

- The computer doesn't have access to the intended interpretation.
- All it knows is the knowledge base.
- The computer can determine if a formula is a logical consequence of KB .
- If $K B \neq g$ then $g$ must be true in the intended interpretation.
- If $K B \not \vDash g$ then there is a model of $K B$ in which $g$ is false. This could be the intended interpretation.


## Semantics in the mind



## Soundness and completeness

Recall that $g$ is a logical consequence of $K B, K B \models g$, precisely if $g$ is true in all models of $K B$.

Let $\vdash$ be a mechanical procedure for deriving a formula $g$ from a knowledge base $K B$, written $K B \vdash g$.
$\vdash$ is sound if $K B \models g$ whenever $K B \vdash g$.

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Two extreme examples:
(1) $K B \vdash g$ for no $g$ sound
(2) $K B \vdash g$ for all $g$ complete

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Two extreme examples:
(1) $K B \vdash g$ for no $g \quad$ 'say nothing' undergenerates sound
(2) $K B \vdash g$ for all $g \quad$ 'say everything' overgenerates complete

## Propositional KBs

## Recall

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \mathrm{i}:-\mathrm{p}, \mathrm{q} . \\
& \mathrm{i}:-\mathrm{r} . \\
& \mathrm{p} . \\
& \mathrm{r} .
\end{aligned}
$$

## Propositional KBs

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& \text { i : }-\mathrm{p}, \mathrm{q} . \\
& \text { i }:-\mathrm{r} . \\
& \text { p. } \\
& \text { r. }
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \mathrm{KB}=[[\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{p}, \mathrm{q}],[\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{r}],[\mathrm{p}],[\mathrm{r}]] \\
& \operatorname{arc}([\mathrm{H} \mid \mathrm{T}], \mathrm{N}, \mathrm{~KB})::- \\
& \operatorname{member}([\mathrm{H} \mid \mathrm{B}], \mathrm{KB}), \\
& \operatorname{append}(\mathrm{B}, \mathrm{~T}, \mathrm{~N}) . \\
& \operatorname{prove}([], \mathrm{KB}) . \\
& \operatorname{prove(Node,KB):-} \operatorname{arc}(\text { Node,Next,KB), } \\
& \operatorname{prove(Next,KB).}
\end{aligned}
$$

## Propositional KBs

Recall

| $\begin{aligned} & \text { i : }-\mathrm{p}, \mathrm{q} . \\ & \text { i }:-\mathrm{r} . \\ & \text { p. } \\ & \text { r. } \end{aligned}$ | ```KB = [[i,p,q],[i,r],[p],[r]] arc([H\|T],N,KB) :- member([H|B],KB) append(B,T,N). prove([],KB). prove(Node,KB) :- arc(Node,Next,KB) prove(Next,KB).``` |
| :---: | :---: |

Let

$$
K B \vdash G \Longleftrightarrow \operatorname{prove}([\mathrm{G}], \mathrm{KB})
$$

Theorem.
(1) $\vdash$ is sound (proved by induction)
(2) $\vdash$ is not complete (why?)

## Logical consequences bottom-up

$$
\begin{aligned}
C_{0} & :=\emptyset \\
C_{n+1} & :=\left\{H \mid\left(\text { for some } B \subseteq C_{n}\right) \operatorname{member}([H \mid B], K B)\right\} \\
C & :=\bigcup_{n \geq 0} C_{n} \\
& =\bigcup_{n \leq k} C_{n} \quad \text { where } k=\text { number of clauses in } K B
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\begin{aligned}
& \text { i }:- \text { p, q. } \\
& \text { i }:-r . \\
& \text { p. } \\
& \text { r. }
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
K B=[[i, p, q],[i, r],[p],[r]]
$$

$$
\operatorname{arc}([\mathrm{H} \mid \mathrm{T}], \mathrm{N}, \mathrm{~KB}):- \text { member }([\mathrm{H} \mid \mathrm{B}], \mathrm{KB}),
$$

$$
\text { append }(\mathrm{B}, \mathrm{~T}, \mathrm{~N})
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
& C_{1}=\{p, r\} \\
& C_{2}=\{p, r, i\}=C_{n} \text { for } n \geq 2
\end{aligned}
$$

A 0 -ary predicate $p$ is interpreted by $I=\langle D, \phi, \pi\rangle$ as

$$
\pi(p): D^{0} \rightarrow\{\text { true,false }\}
$$

## Substitutions and instances

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$$

Let $K$ be a set of constants.
A $K$-substitution is a function from a finite set of variables to $K$ i.e. a set $\left\{V_{1} / c_{1}, \ldots, V_{n} / c_{n}\right\}$ of $c_{i} \in K$ and distinct variables $V_{i}$.

The application e $\theta$ of a $K$-substitution $\theta=\left\{V_{1} / c_{1}, \ldots, V_{n} / c_{n}\right\}$ to a clause $e$ is $e$ with each $V_{i}$ replaced by $c_{i}$

$$
\text { e.g. } p(Z, U, Y, a, X)\{X / b, U / a, Z / b\}=p(b, a, Y, a, b)
$$

A $K$-instance of $e$ is $e \theta$ for some $K$-substitution $\theta$.
Given a set $B$ of clauses and a $K$-substitution $\theta$, let

$$
B \theta:=\{e \theta \mid e \in B\} .
$$

## Bottom-up with substitutions

If $K B$ has constants from some non-empty finite set $K$, let

$$
\begin{aligned}
C_{0}^{K} & :=\emptyset \\
C_{n+1}^{K} & :=\left\{H \theta \mid \theta \text { is a } K \text {-substitution s.t. } B \theta \subseteq C_{n}^{K}\right. \\
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$$

E.g. for $K B=[[p(a, b)],[q(X), p(X, Y)]]$ and $K=\{a, b\}$,

$$
\begin{aligned}
& C_{1}^{K}=\{\mathrm{p}(\mathrm{a}, \mathrm{~b})\} \\
& C_{2}^{K}=\{\mathrm{p}(\mathrm{a}, \mathrm{~b}), \mathrm{q}(\mathrm{a})\}=C^{K}
\end{aligned}
$$

## Soundness \& completeness via Herbrand

The Herbrand interpretation of a set $K B$ of clauses with constants from a non-empty set $K$ is the triple $I=\langle D, \phi, \pi\rangle$ where

- the domain $D$ is the set $K$ of constants
- $\phi$ is the identity function on $K$ (each constant in $K$ refers to itself)
- for each $n$-ary $p$ and $n$-tuple $c_{1} \ldots c_{n}$ from $K$,

$$
\pi(p)\left(c_{1} \ldots c_{n}\right)=\text { true } \Longleftrightarrow p\left(c_{1} \ldots c_{n}\right) \in C^{K}
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Fact. I is a model of $K B$, and every clause true in $I$ is true in every model of $K B$ (interpreting constants in $K$ ).

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Corollary. The bottom-up procedure with substitutions is sound and complete (for Datalog).

## 3 modes of reasoning (C.S. Peirce)

|  |  | typed functional prog $\cong$ proof |
| :--- | :---: | :--- |
| Deduction | deduce | modus ponens $\cong$ function app $f(a)$ |
| Abduction | explain | choose input a from assumables |
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From $\models$ as inclusion $\subseteq$

$$
\begin{aligned}
K B \models g & \Longleftrightarrow \operatorname{Mod}(K B) \subseteq \operatorname{Mod}(g) \\
K B \text { satisfiable } & \Longleftrightarrow \operatorname{Mod}(K B) \not \models \text { false } \\
& \Longleftrightarrow \operatorname{Mod}(K B) \neq \emptyset
\end{aligned}
$$

to weighing alternatives $d \in D$ via probabilities given $K B$

$$
\operatorname{prob}(d \mid K B)=\text { conditional probability of } d \text { given } K B
$$

$\rightsquigarrow$ Bayesian networks ...

